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Abstract. Recent developments in online tracking make it harder for
individuals to detect and block trackers. This is especially true for de-
vice fingerprinting techniques that websites use to identify and track
individual devices. Direct trackers – those that directly ask the device
for identifying information – can often be blocked with browser configu-
rations or other simple techniques. However, some sites have shifted to
indirect tracking methods, which attempt to uniquely identify a device
by asking the browser to perform a seemingly-unrelated task. One type
of indirect tracking known as Canvas fingerprinting causes the browser
to render a graphic recording rendering statistics as a unique identifier.
Even experts find it challenging to discern some indirect fingerprinting
methods. In this work, we aim to observe how indirect device fingerprint-
ing methods are disclosed in privacy policies, and consider whether the
disclosures are sufficient to enable website visitors to block the track-
ing methods. We compare these disclosures to the disclosure of direct
fingerprinting methods on the same websites.
Our case study analyzes one indirect fingerprinting technique, Canvas
fingerprinting. We use an existing automated detector of this fingerprint-
ing technique to conservatively detect its use on Alexa Top 500 websites
that cater to United States consumers, and we examine the privacy poli-
cies of the resulting 28 websites. Disclosures of indirect fingerprinting
vary in specificity. None described the specific methods with enough
granularity to know the website used Canvas fingerprinting. Conversely,
many sites did provide enough detail about usage of direct fingerprint-
ing methods to allow a website visitor to reliably detect and block those
techniques.
We conclude that indirect fingerprinting methods are often technically
difficult to detect, and are not identified with specificity in legal privacy
notices. This makes indirect fingerprinting more difficult to block, and
therefore risks disturbing the tentative armistice between individuals and
websites currently in place for direct fingerprinting. This paper illustrates
differences in fingerprinting approaches, and explains why technologists,
technology lawyers, and policymakers need to appreciate the challenges
of indirect fingerprinting.
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1 Introduction
Companies employ a variety of “fingerprinting” techniques to track consumers’
identities online. These fingerprints are used to identify – or at least significantly
narrow the range of possibilities for – repeated visits to a site by the same
device or individual, or within the same location or web browsing session. In
this work, we focus on device fingerprinting over the web: code on the server of
a website (rather than in email or dedicated applications) that seeks to uniquely
identify each consumer device that visits the site. Device fingerprinting can often
identify a single device in a manner that persists across browsing sessions, that is
throughout usage at different physical and virtual locations and among different
people. We provide a brief summary of direct and indirect methods for device
fingerprinting in the next section, and we refer interested readers to the following
surveys for more detail [1, 2, 7, 19].
From a purely technological viewpoint, the current evolution of device finger-
printing is akin to a cat-and-mouse game. Companies seek increasingly detailed
data and collection techniques to increase their confidence that they have identi-
fied a similar device across different visits. Individuals can respond by declining
to visit certain sites or using blocking software that seeks to prevent those com-
panies from obtaining information that could be used to identify the visitors.
Companies can then refuse to serve their site to individuals using blockers, and
so on. This cat-and-mouse game plays out across many websites.
Anecdotally, much of the web seems to have settled upon a kind of de´tente
at the intersection of technology and policy: companies disclose that they track
devices and use reasonably transparent (or at least detectable) “direct” track-
ing technologies, and the small percentage of consumers who do object to such
tracking use technological tools such as ad blockers to inhibit tracking. Many
companies nevertheless welcome these tracking-inhibiting visitors on their sites.
“Indirect” or “inference-based” fingerprinting works differently, using meth-
ods that serve a purpose unrelated to tracking, like the HTML5 Canvas API,
to develop a unique device identifier. Because these techniques are typically
dual-use – that is, they can fingerprint a user or alternatively perform different
user-friendly function on the website – it is more challenging to detect whether
they are used as trackers. Indeed, there are few public tools that can detect or
block indirect fingerprinting, and these tools might themselves be detected by
websites and used to fingerprint [17].
A privacy-aware user might therefore turn to a company’s privacy policy to
determine whether a site uses indirect fingerprinting techniques. One purpose
of such privacy policies is to tell consumers what type of data the site collects.
A technologically savvy individual could, in theory, review the disclosed finger-
printing methods and design a technical response that meets her comfort level,
which the website could accept or reject. In practice, many sites strike a bal-
ance between disclosure and readability, and thus they purposely avoid some
technical details about how data is collected. But if a privacy policy does not
contain technical details about which indirect tracking methods it uses, creating
a technical block against indirect fingerprinting becomes much more difficult.
In this paper, we examine changes in tracking technology over the past half-
decade, and study how websites explain Canvas fingerprinting in their privacy
policies. We illustrate the differences between direct and indirect fingerprinting.
We analyze the disclosure of indirect fingerprinting in privacy policies to consider
how these techniques may destabilize the delicate direct-fingerprinting truce be-
tween websites and visitors. Finally, we consider whether these differences are
important to potential technical and legal responses.
2 Device Fingerprinting
2.1 Direct Fingerprinting
One common way to identify a device is to directly ask the device for iden-
tifying information. For example, websites can use one of several Application
Programming Interface (API) calls to elicit a client browser to send device in-
formation, such as its operating system or Internet Protocol (IP) address, or
to store identifying information locally for future use (e.g., cookies). Widely-
deployed techniques that websites use in this manner include:
– Collecting header information transmitted through the standard HTTP ex-
change, and using the uniqueness of that data to develop a distinguishable
profile;
– Embedding discreet objects (web beacons, tracking pixels, or clear GIFs)
within a common third-party website, which can be used to track access
patterns; or
– Placing a cookie on the site, either directly or through a third-party tracker.
These techniques enable web servers both to personalize web services (e.g., for
language or region) and to fingerprint the device, often simultaneously or in an
intertwined manner.
Direct fingerprinting methods are easy to detect, understand, and reset.
When used, direct fingerprinting techniques are typically simple to detect be-
cause they operate similarly on all websites and rarely obfuscate their true in-
tention. Novice users can use a web browser’s built-in features or download a
plugin to identify their use. Additionally, expert consumers can examine a log of
all interactions between the web server and the client browser to understand pre-
cisely the type of information obtained by the server and (unless it is encrypted
at rest or in transit by the server) read its contents. Once detected, many di-
rect fingerprinting methods have “reset” mechanisms that decouple future visits
to a website from previous ones; for instance, deleting a cookie with a unique
identifier can have this effect.
Individuals can also proactively block unwanted direct tracking by appro-
priately configuring their client. For example, if a visitor does not want a web
server to learn her device’s operating system, she can configure her browser
to block or falsify the responses to common requests that reveal her oper-
ating system, including the User-Agent field of the HTTP header, and the
navigator.userAgent and navigator.platform properties of the navigator
object within JavaScript. Indeed, modern web browsers give users the ability
to block or control cookie storage, and third-party tools like Adblock Plus and
Privacy Badger allow users to selectively block connections and cookies from
websites that are known to serve ads, web beacons, and other direct trackers.
These blocks can be persistent, in that blocking one direct request for specific
information will block all future requests for the same information. In this way,
a user is empowered to transform the binary choice presented by accessing a
website – use the website with these tracking features, or do not use the website
at all – into a negotiated environment. She can use the website and control some
of the information that the website obtains about her.
2.2 Inference-Based, or Indirect, Fingerprinting
In contrast, inference-based device fingerprinting is a newer set of tracking tech-
niques that use different tools to achieve the same goal. Rather than directly
querying the browser about its localizing features, the server will instead in-
struct the browser to perform a seemingly-unrelated computing task such as
rendering text, audio, a picture, or an animation. Different devices with dif-
ferent configurations, installed libraries, and hardware will perform the task in
slightly different ways, and these subtle differences can be measured and sum-
marized by the server, creating a fingerprint for the device. Many techniques for
web servers to conduct indirect device fingerprinting have arisen over the last
decade, including:
– Measurements of JavaScript performance [13] and conformance [16],
– Font enumeration [10],
– Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) behavior measurement [3],
– VRAM detection [2, p. 5],
– Sensor data access [6], and
– Techniques that use HTML5 APIs [18].
One of these HTML5 APIs is known as the Canvas API. Normally used for
rendering graphics or video on a screen [15], the Canvas can also be used to
fingerprint devices [14] by instructing the client device to render some text or
gradients in the client browser, and then reading back the exact pixel data of the
image rendered by the browser. The image used in a popular open-source finger-
printing script fingerprintjs2 is shown in Figure 1. The resulting fingerprints
are highly effective because they are both highly distinguishing (a large number
of machines yield different renderings) and highly stable (the same machine re-
peatedly yields the same result). The team behind the anonymity-seeking Tor
Browser has called Canvas fingerprinting “the single largest fingerprinting threat
browsers face today” [20], aside from plugins such as Flash. Indeed, Englehardt
and Narayanan [8] also performed an extensive study in 2016 on the top 1 million
websites, and found that 14,371 of those websites employed Canvas fingerprint-
ing. Of these, they found that 98.2% of the Canvas fingerprinting scripts came
from third party websites from around 400 domains.
In this study, we focus on Canvas fingerprinting because it is a reasonably
detectable indirect fingerprinting method that has been well-studied over the
last six years, and there are consequently well-justified heuristics provided by
Acar et al. [1] and Englehardt and Narayanan [8] that distinguish fingerprinting
uses of Canvas from non-fingerprinting uses.
Fig. 1. Graphic sent to clients to draw in Canvas fingerprinting script within
open-source fingerprinting script https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2, com-
mit 563dbde. The way in which the graphic is drawn can be used to fingerprint the
client’s device.
Unlike direct tracking techniques, there are relatively few tools available to
detect or understand Canvas fingerprinting. To analyze whether a Canvas query
is being used at all requires a deeper inspection of the interchange between
server and client than inspecting one’s own HTTP header, identifying a cookie
request, or observing third-party websites calls in the chain of HTTP requests
made when loading a website. Even if an individual does observe the use of a
Canvas query, it is hard to know whether it is used to fingerprint a device or
for some other legitimate graphical purpose. A Canvas API call could use the
information from the web client to create a unique fingerprint, to check whether
the client rendered an image correctly, or to determine how to properly organize
information on the client’s screen. To distinguish between these options, the user
would need to predict how the server is (or will be) processing the resulting data.
Furthermore, tools that allow consumers to automatically mask, reset, or
block Canvas queries are not as well-known as their counterparts to block di-
rect tracking. For example, Adblock Plus, a common ad-blocker, has 11 million
average daily users on Firefox. In contrast, no public tools to effectively block
the fingerprinting existed in 2014 [1], and only a few browser add-ons/extensions
are available today. The most popular Firefox add-on for blocking Canvas fin-
gerprinting has only about 46,000 average daily users as of August 2019.
These tools also may not persistently block the fingerprinting, because the
precise way that a website configures a Canvas query to fingerprint a device may
change over time. Common tools to block direct fingerprinting tend to target
fixed web content and objects – most commonly HTTP header information,
cookies, and connections to third-party websites. With Canvas queries, however,
the fingerprinting scripts could easily be changed, obfuscated, or combined with
commonly used scripts. This could make it more difficult to detect or block
fingerprinting scripts without breaking the functionality of many websites. In
our experiments, we were able to easily detect Canvas fingerprinting websites
that use minor variations of five dedicated fingerprinting scripts. It is possible
we did not detect existing obfuscated fingerprinting techniques.
3 What Do Privacy Policies Say About Fingerprinting?
We studied the ways tracking techniques are discussed in privacy disclosures to
better understand how users might learn about direct versus indirect tracking.
Specifically, we examined 28 privacy policies of websites that appear to use
Canvas queries for fingerprinting purposes. In the United States, the collection
of consumer browsing data on commercial websites is generally regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission, which polices unfair and deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce.1 When a company is not operating in a sector that is
specifically regulated by another statute (e.g., healthcare or finance), the primary
obligation on companies is to provide accurate information about how the site
collects and discloses user data so that a reasonable consumer has meaningful
choice about whether to submit to those practices.2
A privacy policy for a company could reveal information about fingerprinting
by disclosing the specific information it gathers, or by discussing the techniques it
uses to obtain information. Many policies use some combination of these disclo-
sures. With respect to fingerprinting, a policy could specifically explain whether
and/or how the company uses fingerprinting technology, or it could discuss what
data it collects, leaving the inference about which fingerprinting technique it uses
to the consumer. Of course, it could also disclose both technology and data. We
examine the level of specificity of these privacy policy disclosures below. These
disclosures provide a useful base from which to consider further whether indi-
rect fingerprinting methods, such as Canvas, are well-known or widely-publicized
techniques.
3.1 Methodology
To find instances of Canvas fingerprinting on popular websites, we conducted
two web crawls of the Alexa top 500 websites using the code accompanying Acar
et al.’s 2014 study [1]. Run 1 ran on January 15, 2019 from 2:19am to 1:55pm
EST and found Canvas fingerprinting on 40 out of 470 successful connections.
Run 2 ran from January 15 at 4:22pm EST to January 16 at 3:48pm EST and
found Canvas fingerprinting on 42 out of 484 successful connections. In total,
across both runs, we found 49 unique websites that had fingerprinting scripts.
Because our expertise is focused on privacy law within the United States, we
manually inspected these 49 webpages and filtered them based on the following
two criteria.
1. The website’s main page is written in English (30 of 49 websites).
1 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1),(n).
2 See, e.g., In re Liberty Fin. Cos., FTC No. C-3891.
2. The website and its associated privacy policy are written for an audience
of U.S. consumers. We discarded 1 site with the country-specific domain
.co.uk and 1 site for an Indian bank lacking a physical presence in the U.S.
We manually reviewed the privacy policies of the remaining 28 websites3 between
January-July 2019 to determine which disclosures in their policies are intended
to inform consumers about their use of Canvas fingerprinting. At least one legal
scholar and one technologist on our team read each privacy policy and identified
all statements that explicitly or implicitly refer to device fingerprinting.
3.2 Results
All 28 privacy policies share two features in common: they all indicate that the
site uniquely identifies individual devices, and none of them state specifically
that the site uses Canvas fingerprinting. Otherwise, the 28 privacy policies vary
substantially in the specificity of disclosures regarding tracking techniques. We
identified three categories of privacy policy disclosures of Canvas fingerprint-
ing: (1) broad, technology-agnostic language, (2) disclosure of specific direct fin-
gerprinting techniques but not indirect techniques, and (3) specific mention of
collecting “device fingerprints” as distinct from other device-specific identifiers.
One set of privacy policies uses very broad and technology-agnostic language
that covers the capture of granular, device fingerprinting data, but provides little
guidance on specific techniques or types of information captured. For example,
the privacy policy of the website CNET (which is part of CBS, and uses CBS’
general Privacy Policy) states that it collects “[u]nique identifiers and connec-
tion information” of various sorts [4]. Other sites simply note that they collect
“information about your use of the Website, and/or mobile application” [5].
A second group of policies provide more detailed information about how a
site collects data using older tracking technologies, and less specific information
about the types of data they collect through fingerprinting. The majority of pri-
vacy policies investigated fell into this category. Yelp, for example, states that it
may store data “such as your browser type, type of computer or mobile device,
browser language, IP address, WiFi information such as SSID, mobile carrier,
phone number, unique device identifier, advertising identifier, location (includ-
ing geolocation, beacon-based location, and GPS location), and requested and
referring URLs.” [22] This list appears to specifically call out the data typically
obtained from direct tracking techniques like cookies or HTTP header informa-
tion. The list is non-exhaustive, and fingerprinting appears to be covered under
the open-ended “unique device identifier.” That said, the specific disclosures ap-
pear more tailored to older tracking techniques than to fingerprinting. The Fox
News Privacy Policy states that “[i]f you access the Fox News Services from a
3 These sites are americanexpress.com, aol.com, asos.com, bestbuy.com, cam-
bridge.org, capitalone.com, cnet.com, coinmarketcap.com, dell.com, drugs.com,
fiverr.com, forbes.com, foxnews.com, homedepot.com, ikea.com, livescore.com,
msn.com, nike.com, shutterstock.com, slickdeals.net, sonyliv.com, speedtest.net, the-
saurus.com, udemy.com, upwork.com, weather.com, yelp.com, and zillow.com.
mobile or other device, we may collect a unique device identifier assigned to that
device, geolocation data (including your precise location), or other transactional
information for that device,” which reads broadly enough to embrace Canvas
data [12]. Forbes lists its collection by identification technique, specifically stat-
ing that it collects data through “cookies,” “web beacons,” and “log files.” It
also acknowledges that Forbes may retain any “information automatically col-
lected about your usage of the Site” [11]. That open-ended disclosure may well
encompass fingerprinting techniques, but the policy does not expressly identify
Canvas or other indirect fingerprinting technologies in the same way it identifies
some direct tracking techniques.
We also identified one policy that specifically states the website uses de-
vice fingerprinting, but it does not call out the fingerprinting technique that it
uses – Canvas fingerprinting – or explain what data it collects using Canvas fin-
gerprinting. Udemy’s privacy policy lists “device or browser fingerprints” along
with other tracking methods it uses [21]. Describing device fingerprinting specif-
ically in addition to all the other information collected suggests that the website
is indirectly obtaining a fingerprint by measuring the device’s responses (e.g. to
Canvas queries), as opposed to simply using direct queries, even of device-specific
IDs.
3.3 Observations
In short, most privacy policies generally describe what information is collected
rather than providing details on the method of collection. Those that do list
specific tracking technologies tend to omit fingerprinting. And the site that listed
fingerprinting did not state which methods of fingerprinting it deployed. This
may suggest that the public and perhaps the lawyers who draft privacy policies
may not yet be aware of more recent indirect fingerprinting techniques.
Of note, some of the privacy policies may be written to comply with the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [9]. If the GDPR
requires attorneys to more deeply understand and explain the website’s tracking
practices at a technical level, we would expect to see greater clarity in the way
in which fingerprinting, or the data collected thereby, is described in privacy
policies. Companies may seek to harmonize policies across jurisdictions, and
this increased understanding and explanation could benefit people from non-EU
member nations (like the United States) as well. However, that shift did not
jump out in the policies we reviewed at this point in time.
More to the point, even when a policy states that the website uses finger-
printing, it may be difficult to identify which indirect fingerprinting methods the
website uses. All companies in our review indicated that they collect information
that could be used to identify a device – putting consumers on notice that the
site likely correlates user browsing behavior over time. However, the policies we
reviewed did not provide enough information about how data is collected to al-
low even savvy individuals to access the website while proactively blocking such
collection or retrospectively resetting an identifier held by the website.
3.4 Consumer responses
For direct fingerprinting methods, this gap appears to be surmountable. A con-
sumer wishing to hide his browser type may alter her User-Agent and the rel-
evant fields of the JavaScript navigator object, since these are the relevant
methods a website might use to directly query this information. She need not
know the details of the server’s code, since there are limited methods to query
this information directly.
However, for indirect fingerprinting methods, even a consumer who is both
legally and technologically savvy finds little recourse to tracking from either
of her areas of expertise. The individual must first know that a functionality
seemingly unrelated to fingerprinting (like Canvas) can be used to fingerprint.
She must then inspect each use of the functionality and infer whether the purpose
is related to fingerprinting or not. This process could involve an inspection of
client-side code (e.g. the JavaScript code generating the image in Figure 1), or
heuristics that make an educated guess as to how the server-side code will process
the information it receives. The website’s privacy policy does not provide her
with any guidance on how to perform any of the above steps. Ultimately, to use
the website without being fingerprinted, she must choose between being cautious
by overzealously blocking useful website components, or being overconfident that
she has blocked all the tracking that is personally objectionable and missing an
indirect fingerprinting method.
4 Indirect Fingerprinting Shifts the Balance Between
Individuals and Websites
Indirect fingerprinting can be technologically difficult to identify, and may not
be specifically identified in privacy policies. These properties make indirect fin-
gerprinting different than direct methods, where a rough armistice has evolved
between consumers and websites.
4.1 Disturbing a delicate armistice
Direct fingerprinting techniques are often identifiable technologically. They can
also be inferred from the disclosures made in the privacy policy, either because
they are explicitly mentioned or because the policy discloses that it collects data
typically obtained using direct fingerprinting. Once detected, tools are available
(although not universally adopted) to thwart such attempts at fingerprinting.
Many of these tools have been adopted by enough consumers that many web-
sites complain about the use of these techniques and their effect on advertising
revenue. Websites have a technological countermeasure of their own: they can
detect and deny access to consumers who deploy ad-blocking technologies. While
some websites use these anti-blocking tools, most websites opt to accept privacy-
aware consumers who block direct fingerprinting. Put simply: we think the ad
blocking arms race has reached a de facto armistice in which privacy-aware
consumers can choose whether to block direct fingerprinting, and websites can
choose whether to accept consumers who opt to block.
However, indirect fingerprinting disrupts this armistice. Indirect fingerprint-
ing techniques are harder to technically detect and block, and easier for the
company to change and obfuscate. These techniques can serve a functional end
beyond fingerprinting a device, so it is harder to predict whether the website is
using the relevant technique to persistently identify the user or for some other
purpose. Indirect fingerprinting methods are not yet well-known to the general
public, and privacy policies do not specifically describe indirect device finger-
printing methods – even policies that do describe direct methods. In short, con-
sumers do not have an accessible way to learn a website’s indirect fingerprinting
practices.
In the short term, individuals who are unaware of indirect fingerprinting
techniques may mistakenly believe that tools like Adblock Plus and Privacy
Badger are sufficient to prevent tracking. In the longer run, individuals (or the
developers of privacy tools they use) will need to be aware of evolving ways to
fingerprint devices indirectly using an existing API call, and develop methods
to detect and block each of these new methods as they are invented.
4.2 A path forward
The authors of this article have different views about the best path forward and
whether any alternative is better than the current state of affairs. The spectrum
of options ranges from maintaining the status quo while calling attention to
these new techniques, to removing consumer choice entirely and imposing privacy
defaults by law.
The area between these options illustrates multiple tradeoffs. For example,
changing FTC guidance to instruct websites to list all tracking practices would
increase public information about indirect tracking but would make privacy poli-
cies longer, more cumbersome, and less comprehensible to non-technical read-
ers. Requiring companies by law to provide legal or technological means to block
and/or reset individual identifiers would increase consumer choice but would put
new burdens on companies and could adversely impact competition.
It may be possible to use a combination of tools to increase consumer choice
while minimizing other costs. For instance, a social campaign to heighten public
awareness about device fingerprinting might spur consumers to choose sites that
avoid fingerprinting. Alternatively, larger liability for breaches of unique device
identifiers might lead websites to reconsider the value of gathering them.
This work brought together authors with different fundamental perspectives
about the appropriate role for law and regulation in the context of privacy and
consumer protection. Despite our differences, we reached consensus on the tech-
nological and legal state of affairs and improved our understanding of the trade-
offs. We hope this paper lays the foundation for additional conversations and
improves the quality of the debate.
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